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We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around 
the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms 
step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the 
importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a 
difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 
countries around the world from 1990 to 2012. (JEL D22, D43, G34, G38) 
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Price-fixing cartels are pervasive. John Connor’s data set of Private International Cartels, 
comprising 1,014 suspected cartels that were either convicted of price fixing or under 
investigation from 1990 to 2013, reveals the total affected sales of these cartels to be around 
$1.5 trillion. In recent years, the number of new identified cartels has been averaging over 70 
per year, suggesting that the share of industrial output that is cartelized, even for developed 
economies, is substantial.1 
However, as recent trends in the number of detected collusion suggest, cartels are also 
crumbling rapidly. Antitrust enforcement around the world has been steadily picking up speed. 
Total criminal antitrust fines increased from $107 million in 2003 to $1.1 billion in 2012, and 
total prison sentences increased from an annual average of 3,313 days in the 1990s to 23,398 
days by the end of 2012. Higher fines and new tools such as leniency programs for cartel 
whistleblowers have led to unprecedented enforcement action not only in the United States and 
the European Union (EU) but also in the rest of the world. 
The breakdown of collusive activities that involve higher prices and restricted output is 
likely to result in the expansion of production. It might also lead to technological change:  
colluding firms have fewer incentives to innovate, especially when they face little threat of 
external competition (Vives 2008). We predict that such expansion in production capacity and 
investment in technological change when moving from the collusive to the oligopolistic 
equilibria will cause the financing deficits of firms to increase. That might trigger a change in 
the means of financing and a likely change in the leverage.  
In this paper, we study how firms adjust their financing strategies when the cost of collusion 
become higher and cartels break up. On the one hand, such increased competition in the product 
                                                          
1  Some countries (e.g., Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia) had cartel registries at the time when cartels were not illegal in those countries. Hyytinen, 
Steen, and Toivanen (2018) report that in 105 of 193 Finnish manufacturing industries at least one cartel of 
national scope was registered between 1950 and 1990. Their estimates based on the hidden Markov model suggest 
that, by the end of 1990, almost all industries were cartelized.  
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market could make firms raise debt that provides convex incentives to managers (Brander and 
Lewis 1986; Maksimovic 1988). On the other hand, the firms might be rebalancing their capital 
structure due to the trade-off considerations as lower profitability and higher ex ante probability 
of default make debt less appealing. 
Yet these direct capital structure considerations of pure debt-equity rebalancing and the 
strategic use of debt are unlikely to be the only relevant factors in the environment when firms 
are moving between different competitive equilibria. The firms are likely to adjust their product 
market strategies and such readjustment would lead to a different asset mix which would mean 
indirect implications to the capital structure choices. In particular, firms might be increasing 
financing to sustain financial flexibility (Fresard 2010; Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 2014). 
While both debt and equity can provide such financial flexibility, the exact mix of debt and 
equity is likely to be a function of the type of investment that the firm is trying to raise. Indeed, 
expansion of the physical factories might be easier to finance with debt suited to fund 
collateralizable assets while intangible investment might be better suited to fund with the equity 
(Kerr and Nanda 2015). Firms might also raise money to keep as excess funds that can be held 
in cash balance as a competitive threat to rivals. In that case, equity might also be preferable as 
debt limits firm’s ability to respond to product market threats by removing excess funds 
(Phillips 1995; Kovenock and Phillips 1995, 1997). 
Since theory does not provide clear predictions about how firms’ financing behavior 
responds to such a change in the competitive regime, in this paper we take advantage of the 
variation in the cost of collusion coming from the staggered passage of leniency legislation in 
63 countries from 1993 to 2011 to study how more aggressive cartel enforcement affects firms’ 
debt-equity choices and financial leverage. Leniency programs have been one of the most 
important developments for cartel detection and deterrence (Chen and Rey 2013). By allowing 
reduced fines or even providing immunity to cartel members that collaborate in conviction 
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cases, leniency laws are expected to have increased the costs of forming cartels and the benefits 
of breaking them up.2 Such strengthening of antitrust policy has changed the competitive 
landscape and thus provides an opportunity to identify the effect of changes in the strategic 
interactions between firms on their financing choices and capital structure. 
Importantly, countries passed the leniency programs at different points in time between 
1993 and 2011. Based on this staggered nature of the law passage, we attempt to identify the 
effect of a less collusive product market environment on firms’ financing decisions by 
following a difference-in-differences strategy. In other words, controlling for firm and time 
fixed effects, we compare the change in financing choices of firms that were affected by the 
law to the contemporaneous change in choices of the control group of firms that were 
headquartered in the countries that have not yet passed such a law. 
We find that following the adoption of a leniency law, firms expand by increasing asset 
growth, coming from higher cash holdings, capital expenditures, and investment in intangible 
assets, and they fund this expansion by issuing more equity. In some of our specifications, debt 
issuance activity also increases, though much more modestly. Consistent with more aggressive 
equity issuance, with some exceptions, we also find that leverage declines following the 
adoption of a leniency law. 
Our results are robust when we control for industry*year, region*year, and 
industry*region*year fixed effects to filter out regional or industry-specific trends that could 
simultaneously affect financing choices of firms and competition policy. We also control for 
observable variables capturing macroeconomic conditions. To mitigate the concern that the 
adoption of these laws signaled other events that could affect capital structure through 
                                                          
2 Dong, Massa, and Žaldokas (2017) show that, after the passage of leniency laws, the gross margin of affected 
firms decreases by 14.8%. A recent case in which four European truck manufacturers (Daimler, Iveco, DAF, and 
Volvo) were awarded a combined EUR 2.93 billion of total penalties, whereas MAN, another company that 
participated in the collusion, received full immunity for revealing the existence of the 14-year long cartel is a good 
example of the application of a leniency law. 
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alternative channels, we control for import penetration to capture the effect of trade 
agreements; industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI); country’s capital account 
openness; adoption of competition law and other anticartel legislation; corporate governance 
reforms; stock and credit market development; country’s rule of law, governance, and 
regulatory quality; and corporate tax changes. 
While existing evidence suggests that cartels are quite pervasive, the above results do not 
distinguish between firms that are members of cartels, and those that are not. We expect our 
results to be stronger for the former. Using a database on actual cartel convictions, we predict 
the propensity for a firm to be a member of a convicted cartel based on its industry and country, 
and other firm characteristics. We find that our results are significantly stronger for firms with 
higher predicted probability of being part of a cartel. We also explore cross-industry 
heterogeneity and find that our results are stronger in the cases where collusion is more stable 
according to the theory predictions: for firms in the more concentrated industries, firms in the 
industries that use less patent protection, and firms in low-growth industries.  
As an additional source of variation, we look at how the financing choices of firms in a 
country respond not only to that country’s adoption of leniency laws but also to the adoptions 
in other countries where these firms are likely to experience product market interactions. In 
particular, we look at how a firm is affected by the passage of leniency laws in countries that 
are major export destinations of the firm’s industry and in countries where the firm’s 
subsidiaries are located. An appealing feature of this setting is that the passage of a leniency 
law in another country is likely to be even more exogenous to any other factors in the home 
country that might simultaneously affect financing decisions of firms and antitrust policy. 
Indeed, we find consistent results that asset growth and equity issuance also increases for firms 
in an industry when other countries that are important export destinations for that industry 
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adopt a leniency law, or when the laws are adopted in countries where the firms’ subsidiaries 
are located. 
Finally, we look at another case of strengthening anticartel legislation, the enactment of 
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) in the United States in 
2004. The act increased the fines and provided more incentives for leniency law applicants, 
and thus has been lauded as one of the most significant revisions in the history of the U.S. 
antitrust system. We again predict the propensity for a firm to be a member of a convicted 
cartel based on its industry and firm characteristics. We find that U.S. firms with higher 
predicted probability of being part of a cartel increased asset growth, financing deficit, and 
equity issuance. 
What we demonstrate in this paper is consistent with the interpretation that when the nature 
of equilibrium in the product market changes from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms 
increase asset growth, by raising cash holdings and investment, and finance such investment 
with equity to retain financial flexibility. Given that all former cartel members are expected to 
expand investment in production capacity and increase output, financing the expansion with 
debt would make firms vulnerable to rival firms changing their strategies and expanding 
production capacity even more aggressively with equity financing.3 
At first glance, our results are also consistent with the trade-off theory, which suggests that, 
when profits are expected to fall, firms will reduce leverage. Indeed, Xu (2012) examines the 
effect of higher import penetration (instrumented by tariff cuts and exchange rate changes) on 
leverage, and finds that leverage drops even controlling for current profitability. She attributes 
this to expected lower future profitability following a reduction of barriers to entry into the 
industry. An important difference between Xu’s (2012) setting and ours is that unlike firms 
                                                          
3 For example, while immediately issuing equity might involve some wealth transfer to debtholders, equity issuers 
would be unencumbered by the debt overhang problem and even greater wealth transfer when pursuing future 
expansion. Zingales (1998) finds that, after the Carter deregulation of the trucking industry, firms with higher pre-
deregulation debt levels invested less, and this affected adversely their survival likelihood. 
6 
 
exposed to greater import competition who experience decrease in asset growth, firms newly 
exposed to leniency law increase asset growth. Byoun (2008) finds that firms with above-target 
debt ratios are much slower to adjust capital structure toward the target when they have a 
financing deficit, as opposed to when they have a financing surplus.4 Therefore, since firms 
newly exposed to a leniency law increase their asset growth and financing deficits as they 
expand output and capacity, it is unlikely that the significant increase in equity issuance activity 
is purely driven by debt-ratio rebalancing motives. For these firms, equity issuance serves the 
dual roles of maintaining financial flexibility in the face of competition and financing asset 
growth.  
Finally, a contemporaneous paper by Ferrés, Ormazabal, and Sertsios (2016) examines 
capital structure choices of U.S firms that were discovered to have participated in a cartel. They 
find that these firms reduce leverage during the collusion period, which is seemingly at odds 
with our findings. A few differences in setup might explain this. First, Ferrés, Ormazabal, and 
Sertsios (2016) only consider U.S. firms that have been convicted, while we examine all U.S. 
and international firms that have been exposed to leniency law. Second, the behavior of firms 
that recognize that collusion is no longer feasible could be dissimilar from that of firms prior 
to entering a period of collusion. Interestingly, the results on equity issuance and repurchase 
activities are quite symmetric, – while we find that firms step up equity issuance after the 
introduction of leniency law, Ferrés, Ormazabal, and Sertsios (2016) discover that firms 
repurchase equity during collusion period (but presumably also reduce debt as they become 
more profitable).  
 
1. Relation to Literature 
                                                          
4 Hovakimian (2004) also finds that offsetting the accumulated deviation from the target is not the primary reason 
for issuing or repurchasing equity. Only debt reductions by above target firms are used to adjust back to the target, 
with debt issuances generally causing high debt firms to further deviate from target. 
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We first provide a brief background of the theoretical literature on product market collusion 
that motivates our empirical enquiry. Two parts of this literature are relevant for our study. The 
first concerns the implications of a change in the nature of competition from collusion to 
oligopolistic competition on firms’ investment behavior. The second studies the implications 
of such a change (and the associated investment behavior) on firms’ financing choices, 
especially, the choice between debt and equity. 
 
1.1 Collusion versus oligopolistic competition 
Firms collude to maximize joint profits. They do so by restricting output and charging higher 
prices than what would prevail if they did not coordinate their output and pricing decisions.  
Collusion is typically distinguished by being explicit or being tacit. Explicit collusion occurs 
when participating firms communicate with each other and fix prices, production capacities, or 
input costs such as wages. Colluding firms might also divide geographic or product markets. 
In most jurisdictions, such cartels which result in lower consumer welfare are illegal and are 
subject to the antitrust enforcement. When a cartel arrangement is no longer sustainable (e.g., 
because of more stringent antitrust enforcement), the participating firms become competitors, 
and the market structure becomes an oligopoly. Regardless of whether the strategic variables 
chosen by the firms are prices or quantities (and the resultant competition is characterized by 
Cournot or Bertrand competition), prices are lower and qualities are higher compared to the 
collusive outcome. 
Collusion also can be a tacit when it involves no direct communication between firms. Even 
such collusion can be stable if it involves a repeated interaction between firms over many 
periods. Firms coordinate their prices to levels that are above those that would prevail if they 
were interacting only once. This is possible under the threat of “retaliation” should any firm 
deviate and undercut the rivals. To be effective, the retaliation must imply sufficient loss of 
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long-term profits so that the loss outweighs the gain from a one-time deviation, and it must also 
be in the best interests of the retaliating firms to continue with the retaliation. In a repeated 
game setting, a multiplicity of equilibria are possible under collusion, but all of them result in 
higher joint profits, higher prices, and more restrictive output compared to the absence of 
collusion. 
Unlike explicit collusion, tacit collusion is difficult to prosecute.5 However, because of the 
absence of direct communication, it may be difficult for firms to coordinate their prices, 
especially when firms are asymmetric because of the multiplicity of equilibria. Many collusive 
arrangements will have both tacit and explicit components. Grout and Sonderegger (2005) 
argue that “parties might be more likely to engage in overtly collusive practices specifically in 
those circumstances that are predicted by the theory as being adverse to collusion” because 
“the need for cartel members to communicate intensifies precisely when collusion is harder to 
sustain.” More stringent antitrust enforcement targeting explicit collusion may therefore cause 
even tacit collusion more difficult to sustain. 
When collusion (either explicit or tacit) breaks down and firms have to compete with each 
other for market share, new investment may be necessary. One simple reason for this is that 
each firm will produce more in the new equilibrium, and this might require investment in 
additional production capacity. Firms may also have to step up investment in research and 
development (R&D), accelerate new product development, and hold more cash to finance such 
expenditures in the future and deal with predatory tactics by rivals. All this is likely to generate 
a demand for financing. We next discuss the financing choices firms face. 
 
 
                                                          
5 For instance, in the decision Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation (no. 14-2301, April 9, 2015), Judge Richard 
Posner stated that it is “difficult to prove illegal collusion without witnesses to an agreement” and that 
circumstantial evidence “consistent with an inference of collusion, but [. . .] equally consistent with independent 





1.2 Implications for financing 
In contrast to the implications for investment and R&D spending when the equilibrium 
switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, the financing choices that firms will make 
are far from clear. 
Debt financing makes equityholders’ payoff convex in cash flows. The literature on the 
strategic role of debt (Brander and Lewis 1986; Maksimovic 1988; Dasgupta and Titman 1998) 
is based on the premise that limited liability could affect the product market choices of firms. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) show that firms in an oligopoly have an incentive to choose debt in 
equilibrium. This is the case regardless of whether firms compete in prices or quantities. 
However, there is no role for debt when firms are colluding and maximizing shareholder value, 
regardless of whether firms are colluding tacitly in a repeated game setting (Maksimovic 1988) 
or whether they are colluding explicitly and setting prices to maximize joint profit each period 
(Brander and Lewis 1986).6 However, it is difficult to infer directly from these models what 
one should expect regarding financing or capital structure choice if, for exogenous reasons, the 
nature of competition changes from collusion to oligopolistic competition. One reason for this 
is that investment decisions are typically not considered in these models, and as noted, the 
transition to a new product market equilibrium may well entail new investment in tangible and 
intangible assets, which in turn might affect financing choice and affect subsequent capital 
structure. 
Another line of research emphasizes the need to maintain financial flexibility under 
competitive pressure. Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997) explicitly consider the role of capital 
                                                          
6 In fact, Maksimovic (1988) shows that, once the coupon payment on a perpetual bond exceeds the profit in the 
retaliation phase following deviation, higher debt makes collusion more difficult to sustain. 
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structure in financing investment in oligopolistic product markets. The authors argue that firms 
will be constrained in expanding production capacity once internal funds are exhausted. Given 
rival firms’ choices, this will happen at lower levels of production capacity when the debt ratio 
is higher. When firms compete in prices, higher debt ratios can increase both own and rival 
firms’ prices and profits. 7  This reasoning suggests that when collusion gives way to 
oligopolistic competition and firms need to expand investment, they would prefer to maintain 
lower debt ratios and preserve internal financing.    
Fairly robust empirical support has been provided for such a “financial flexibility” 
argument. Zingales (1998) examines the effect of deregulation in the trucking industry. He 
finds that, consistent with Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997), debt overhang model (Myers 
1977), and models of “deep pockets” and predatory behavior (Telser 1966; Benoit 1984; Bolton 
and Scharfstein 1990), firms with high leverage prior to deregulation are more likely to exit the 
industry, due to their inability to compete effectively by increasing investment and charging 
lower prices. 8  Subsequent empirical research has also found the importance of financial 
flexibility in competitive environments.9 In our context, this line of research would imply that 
as collusion ends, firms need to be poised to increase investment and compete aggressively. 
This requires less reliance on debt as opposed to equity, and building up internal liquidity.  
Mainstream theories of capital structure provide additional perspectives on this issue. 
Firms—especially larger firms that are more likely to be cartel members—generally finance 
their capital expenditures with debt, rather than equity. When collusion ends, they are in a 
                                                          
7 Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997) find evidence that after leveraged recapitalizations, firms reduce investment, 
whereas rivals do the opposite. This evidence is consistent with their theory, but they point out that the evidence 
is also consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen’s (1986) argument also predicts lower 
leverage when collusion breaks down, as the free cash flow problem is likely to be less important. 
8 Chevalier (1995) finds that supermarket chains that underwent leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the 1980s were 
more likely to close stores in local areas that competed with low-debt major rivals. Prices tended to drop in these 
markets after the LBO, suggesting predation by rival non-LBO firms. 
9 Fresard (2010) finds that larger cash holdings allow market share gains at the expense of rivals, especially when 
product market competition is intense, and also deters entry. Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) document that 
firms build up cash by cutting dividends when competition becomes more intense. 
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situation where they need to step up their investment, but at the same time, they experience 
decrease in their profitability. In this situation, the pecking order hypothesis suggests that the 
reliance on debt financing would increase. On the other hand, the trade-off theory of capital 
structure calls for lower optimal leverage as expected bankruptcy costs increase. Firms are 
therefore expected to rebalance to a lower leverage ratio.10 However, the literature also finds 
that trade-off-type rebalancing mostly occurs when firms have a financing surplus, that is, when 
their growth opportunities slow down and internal funds are used to reduce debt. There is little 
evidence that highly levered firms rebalance via equity issuance, presumably because such 
rebalancing entails wealth transfer to bondholders.  
Finally, the type of financing that firms seek in the new equilibrium is likely to be sensitive 
to the type of assets they acquire. Fixed assets that can be collateralized are typically financed 
with debt, whereas riskier R&D investment, advertising, employee training are easier to finance 
with equity. Moreover, if firms want to carry a liquidity buffer either to fend off predatory 
threats or to finance future investment by adding to their cash holdings, equity is likely to be 
the preferred financing choice.11  
The change from a collusive regime to an oligopolistic one thus is very likely to be 
associated with additional external financing, with both debt and equity being issued, but their 
relative importance is ultimately an empirical question.  
 
2. Empirical Strategy and Data 
2.1 Background on leniency laws 
                                                          
10  Indeed, Ovtchinnikov (2010) and Xu (2012) find that leverage goes down when competition intensifies, 
consistent with trade-off theory. The other recent consistent findings include those of Valta (2012), who finds that 
the threat of import competition is associated with higher cost of debt, and Klasa et al. (2018), who find that the 
risk of losing trade secrets causes firms to maintain lower leverage. 
11 A simultaneous increase in cash holding and debt protects the firm against defaulting on existing debt, but 
creates a new liability, so the firm is still vulnerable to predation. Moreover, if predatory strategies by rivals—
especially those who raise financing via equity issuance—cause the cash raised to become depleted, an overhang 
problem is created (Myers 1977) that will confer considerable strategic advantage to rivals. 
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Given the importance of the antiwelfare implications of product market collusion, governments 
have devoted considerable resources in tackling it. One of the most effective tools has been the 
introduction of leniency programs (or leniency laws). Leniency laws allow market regulators 
or the courts to grant full or partial amnesty to those firms that, despite being a part of a 
collusive agreement, cooperate in providing information about it. In particular, a typical 
leniency program stipulates that the first firm that provides substantial evidence to the 
government (if the latter does not yet have sufficient evidence to prosecute the cartel) gets 
automatic amnesty. In countries where the firm's managers, employees and directors may face 
criminal liability for participating in a collusive agreement, as is the case in the United States, 
amnesty also extends to waiving such criminal liability. As suggested by Hammond (2005), 
U.S. leniency law, which was strengthened in 1993, proved successful in destabilizing existing 
cartels and deterring the formation of new cartels and has thus inspired other countries to pass 
similar laws. Dong, Massa, and Žaldokas (2017) show that the passage of leniency laws 
significantly harms collusion. In particular, they find that the passage of leniency laws increases 
conviction rates and generally lowers gross margins of firms, thus also capturing the effect of 
leniency laws on the unobservable break-ups of cartels. Table 1 reports the list of leniency law 
passage years around the world. 
Although the laws are not passed in a vacuum and are arguably influenced by economic 
and political conditions in the respective countries, countries do not seem to have followed one 
particular trend and reason for such law passage. Some countries passed the law after prominent 
collusion cases. For instance, Hungary did so after it faced significant criticism concerning its 
competition investigation against mobile telephone operators, while Switzerland strengthened 
its competition law in 2003, including the passage of leniency laws, after it failed to prosecute 
firms involved in the vitamin cartel. Taiwan passed the law as a response to general concerns 
about rising consumer prices. 
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Other countries passed leniency laws after significant pressures from the United States, the 
EU, or supranational organizations (Lipsky 2009). For instance, Mexico passed the law in 2006 
following general recommendations of an OECD Peers Review in 2004 on Competition Law 
and Policy in Mexico which reported that its antitrust authority needs better investigative tools, 
including the ability to give leniency to a whistleblower revealing secret cartel conduct. 
Similarly, the United States had bargained for strengthening of Singapore’s antitrust law in its 
negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement.12 Moreover, the EU has fostered the adoption 
of leniency laws by its member states and often seeks similar provisions in its bilateral 
association and trade agreements. The IMF and the World Bank ask for the overhaul of antitrust 
laws as a condition for loans and other funding (Bradford 2012). 
In some cases, the passage of leniency laws was contentious. For instance, the leniency law 
met significant opposition in the Swiss Parliament as the law relies on denunciations that run 
contrary to Swiss legal tradition. Japanese Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the most 
influential industrial organization in Japan, extensively argued against such a law in Japan, 
claiming that cooperating and informing on fellow participants in exchange for a lower sanction 
is an affront to Japanese culture, and should only be considered as part of the wider review of 
the entire criminal law system. In Table IA1, we report the table from Dong, Massa, and 
Žaldokas (2017) that estimates the Cox proportional hazard model, predicting the passage of 
leniency law in the country. The most consistent predictor is the economic development of the 
country as proxied by the log gross domestic product (GDP). Right-wing affiliation of the chief 
executive has a negative effect, as compared to center- or left-wing orientation. 
 
                                                          
12 One may argue that free trade agreements might affect market structure in a way similar to cartel busting. 
Mindful of Singapore’s case, we carefully control for country’s levels of trade and this does not affect our results. 
Moreover, we are not aware of any other case apart from Singapore, where a leniency law was passed as an 
outcome of a trade deal. Finally, most trade agreements are regional. Controlling for region*year fixed effects or 




Against this background, we posit that no single particular trend has led to leniency law 
passages. We thus employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy to estimate the 
effect of competition on financing strategies of firms.  
Our main estimates are then based on the following regression specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑤)𝑘𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,       (1) 
where i, k, and t index firms, countries, and years, respectively. The dependent variables Yit 
correspond to the asset growth, total net external financing (financing deficit), change in 
common equity over the lagged book value of assets (equity issuance), the change in debt over 
the lagged book value of assets (debt issuance), or the debt-to-equity ratio, defined as the book 
value of debt over shareholder equity.  
(Leniency Law)kt equals 0 before the passage of the leniency law in country k, and 1 
afterward. Xikt is a vector of the different firm, country and industry controls, while γ and τ are 
firm and year fixed effects, respectively. In our baseline specification, our control variables Xikt 
include firm size and profitability, the country’s GDP and unemployment rate, imports as a 
percentage of GDP, and the exchange rate. In a standard difference-in-differences setting with 
staggered implementation of laws (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Giroud and Mueller 
2010), the treated group comprises all firms that are headquartered in countries that have 
passed a leniency law by year t. The control group comprises firms in countries that never 
adopted a leniency law in our sample period and firms headquartered in countries that adopted 
a leniency law at some later point of time. 
In addition to using the passage of leniency laws in a firm's headquarter country, we 
implement an alternative identification strategy. We create a treatment variable based on a 
firm’s exposure to the passage of leniency laws in those countries to which the firm’s industry 
sends a significant fraction of its exports. By making it more difficult to form international 
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cartels with industry peers in the countries that are likely to be firm’s sales markets, the passage 
of leniency law in another country also increases the costs of collusion. 
This continuous variable that we call “Export market leniency laws” is even more 
exogenous to political and economic conditions in a firm’s country. It is estimated as the 
weighted average of the passage of laws in all other countries, excluding the country of the 
firm's headquarters: 
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑤)𝑗𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤?̂?𝑗𝐿?̂?𝑡?̂? , 
where ?̂? denotes any country other than country k, j denotes a three-digit SIC industry, t denotes 
year. 𝑤?̂?𝑗 is the share of three-digit SIC industry j’s exports from country k to any other country 
?̂? out of all exports from industry j in country k in 1990. 𝐿?̂?𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 
1 if country ?̂? has passed a leniency law by year t and 0 otherwise. To avoid endogeneity of 
industry structures, we remove the time variation and base the weights on the data in year 1990. 
The variable ranges from 0 when leniency laws are not passed in any country with any market 
share in the firm’s industry to 1 when all foreign countries with any share in the firm’s industry 
have passed the leniency law. 
Our alternative specification is then as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑤)𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.      (2) 
Unlike Equation (1), in Equation (2), unless no country to which a firm’s industry is 
exporting has passed a leniency law, a firm is considered as treated, and the intensity of 
treatment changes as more of the countries to which this industry exports adopt leniency law.  
Finally, our third identification strategy relies even more directly on the international nature 
of firm operations. In the specifications above, we assign our treatment of leniency law passage 
based on the firm's headquarter country, where presumably most firms have most of their sales. 
Export market leniency laws measure already considers that firms also sell to other countries 
and are exposed to the other countries’ antitrust codes. However, for a subset of firms we go 
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further and have collected data on their actual international operations. We can thus test 
whether the passage of laws in other countries where they operate, also has a significant effect. 
More specifically, we measure a firm’s exposure to leniency laws by looking at the distribution 
of the firm's operations around the world in terms of sales as recorded in Lexis-Nexis Corporate 
Affiliations database. So, we construct a measure of exposure to leniency law changes based 
on the proportion of firm activity that takes place in the country that experiences the law 
change. To illustrate, consider two firms, A and B, both headquartered in Germany. Firm A 
has 75% of its operations in Germany, and 25% in France; firm B has 25% of its operations in 
Germany and 75% in France. So, when Germany introduced the leniency law in 2000, firm A 
should have been affected more than firm B. 
 
2.3 Data 
In our analysis, we consider all nonfinancial firms in Worldscope, Compustat Global, and 
Compustat North America data sets from 1990 to 2012. We start with Compustat Global and 
Compustat North America samples and following the techniques described in Karolyi and Wu 
(2018) we augment this data set with Worldscope data as this allows us expand the sample of 
international firms we cover in our analysis and provides additional variables we can use in the 
analysis. Our initial sample covers 633,400 firm-years. We report some descriptive statistics in 
Table 1. 
We collect information on the passage of leniency laws in 63 large countries from the Cartel 
Regulation 2013, published by Getting the Deal Through. We manually double check this 
information and complement it using press releases and news articles in Factiva database. We 
report the years when leniency laws were passed in Table 2. 
Export data used to construct Export market leniency laws measure comes from CEPII 
TradeProd Database that has bilateral trade flows for more than 200 countries at ISIC industry 
17 
 
level over 1980-2006. We match them to the three-digit SIC and average over the respective 
values within the three-digit SIC in case multiple three-digit ISIC codes match to three-digit 
SIC codes. The data on firm operations around the world come from the subsidiary data in 
Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database. 
 
3. Main Results 
3.1 Univariate results 
We start by plotting asset growth and financing deficit for the affected firms. Figure 1 plots the 
mean of the mean change in asset growth of treated firms and control firms in the same industry, 
2 years before and 5 years after the adoption of a leniency law in a country. Thus, the control 
firms are all firms in the same industry in countries that had not passed a leniency law in the 7 
years surrounding the event date.  
While we see that the treated and the control firms start from the same level, asset growth 
starts shooting up for the treated firms in the year after the passage of leniency laws but later 
trends level off. Similarly, for the financing deficit, we see rather parallel trends 2 years before 
the law passage and then diverging trends 1 year after the law passage. These results suggest 
that asset growth and financing deficit increase after the passage of leniency laws. We also 
report corresponding graphs for equity and debt issuance. Later, we further study these trends 
in a regression setting. 
 
3.2 Leniency laws and asset growth 
In this section, we present regression results to examine the effect of leniency law adoption by 
a country on the asset growth of firms in that country. We first provide general results on 
whether firms increase their asset size, and we later deconstruct whether such increase comes 
from the capital expenditures in expanding capacity, the investment into intangible assets, or 
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the increase in the cash buffer. We report the specifications where we use the passage of the 
leniency law as our treatment variable in Table 3, panel A, and the results where we study 
export market leniency law in Table 3, panel B.  
3.2.1 Baseline regressions. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents results on our baseline specifications in the difference-in-
differences setting, which incorporates firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
the annual asset growth. In Column 1, we only consider the effect of a leniency law without 
any additional controls, and, in Column 2, we add firm-specific variables and several other 
variables to capture macroeconomic conditions and import competition. We see that leniency 
law passage is associated with higher asset growth. We choose the latter specification to be our 
baseline, and we find that the asset growth increases by as much as 7% in our specification, 
which corresponds to one-third of the unconditional mean in the sample. 
In Column 3, we add the additional control variables: tangibility, sales growth, lagged by 
2 years, and industry market-to-book ratio.13 Tangibility, estimated as the proportion of fixed 
assets over total assets, should capture firm’s collateralizable assets while the lagged sales 
growth should capture growth opportunities. While our data limitations do not allow us to 
control for individual market-to-book ratios for international firms going back to 1990s, we 
control for industry market-to-book ratio to capture industry growth opportunities. We 
calculate the latter based on Compustat North America data as the three-digit SIC industry 
median, and we control for it for all—even non-North American—countries. These additional 
controls come at the expense of substantially reducing our sample but we still find that the 
passage of a leniency law has a significant positive effect on the asset growth.  
                                                          
13 For the primary dependent variables of interest, our regression specifications maintain the same set of control 
variables. Tangibility, sales growth, and market-to-book ratio are common control variables in the capital structure 
literature. We include these control variables separately as their availability shrinks the sample size. We report 
the estimates for the control variables in Tables 3–8 and Tables IA2–IA7. 
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In Column 4, we control for industry*year fixed effects. This means that we are comparing 
treated and control firms in the same year in the same industry. As a result, the specification 
controls for any common industry trends that could be correlated with leniency law adoption. 
The coefficient of leniency law remains positive and significant. Column 5 includes 
region*year fixed effects to absorb factors at the regional level, such as those related to 
multilateral or regional trade agreements, or any regional economic trends that could affect the 
capital structure and the propensity of leniency law adoption in these regions. 14  The 
specification thus explores variation within adopting and nonadopting countries within each 
region and year to examine whether there is any effect of leniency law adoption on asset 
growth. The coefficient of leniency law adoption is positive and significant. 
Finally, in Columns 6 and 7, we perform two important robustness checks that relate to two 
particular geographic areas. Since the United States adopted a leniency law very early in our 
sample period, and at the same time U.S. firm-years constitute one-fourth of the regression 
sample in Column 2, it is possible that our results are driven by a time-trend affecting U.S. 
firms only. In Column 6, only non-U.S. firm-years are retained, and both the magnitude of the 
effect decreases but also the significance of the effect of leniency law drops.15 Finally, in 
Column 7, we address a possible concern with the determination of the year when a leniency 
law becomes relevant for firms in the EU. While the EU adopted a leniency law that would 
become applicable to all EU member countries in 2002, individual countries passed a leniency 
law that would apply to all firms doing business with these countries in a staggered manner. In 
Column 7, we assume that the effective date for leniency for an EU member is the later of 2002 
and the year the country joined the EU. Our results remain unchanged. 
3.2.2 Export market leniency laws. 
                                                          
14 We allocate countries into seven geographic regions: North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Central 
and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. 
15 We report all our results when we exclude U.S. firms from our sample. These results are available in Table IA8. 
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In this section, we repeat the same tests used in Table 3, panel A, but replace the leniency law 
adoption indicator variable with the Export market leniency laws measure that looks at the 
leniency law adoption in the countries other than the firm headquarter country. In addition, we 
study the subsidiary-sales-weighted measure of leniency law adoption in other countries. 
Table 3, panel B, reports the results. The coefficient of the Export market leniency laws 
variable is positive and significant in all specifications. The results suggest that as the exposure 
of domestic firms to markets under leniency law increases, suggesting greater exposure to 
markets characterized by noncollusive behavior, asset growth rises. Results for subsidiary 
exposure to leniency laws reported in Column 7 are similar.  
We perform similar sets of robustness tests as before. Columns 2 and 3 control for 
additional firm variables. Column 4 includes three-digit SIC industry*year fixed effects. 
Column 5 includes geographic region*year fixed effects. Column 6 restricts the sample to non-
U.S. firms. Our results are robust to these specifications. 
Using both identification strategies, we find that stronger actions against collusion have led 
to a faster growth in assets, that is, larger investment. We note that such increase in asset growth 
and investment comes despite the drop in profitability (see Dong, Massa, and Žaldokas 2017 
for this result). 
3.2.3 Deconstructing asset growth. 
As we argue in Section 1, the actual use of funds is likely to determine the type of financing. 
The expansion of the physical factories might be easier to finance with debt suited to fund 
collateralizable assets while intangible investment might be better suited to fund with the 
equity. Firms might also raise money, raised from equity issuances, to keep as excess funds 
that can be kept as a competitive threat to rivals. We thus next check where the growth in the 
assets is coming from. We group the change in assets into three categories: (a) capital 
expenditures; (b) investment in intangible assets; (c) and the change in cash holdings. 
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We then estimate our specifications like in Table 3, panel A, Column 2, and in Table 3, 
panel B, Column 2, on these three different components.16 In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we 
report the results for capital expenditures, defined as the change in tangible assets, adjusted for 
depreciation and scaled by lagged assets. In Columns 3 and 4, we report the results for change 
in intangible assets, adjusted for amortization and scaled by lagged assets. In Columns 5 and 
6, we report the results for change in cash and short-term investments, scaled by lagged assets. 
These results show that leniency laws have led to the increase in investment into both tangible 
and intangible assets and most notably in increased holdings of cash. The increase in cash 
holdings could be a consequence of fixed costs of issuance, because of which firms raise more 
than they plan to invest immediately and hold cash for future investment, or because of a need 
to maintain financial flexibility to fend off predatory threats by rival firms. 
 
3.3 Financing deficit and issuance activity 
Further, we look at financing deficit. Following Chang and Dasgupta (2009), the financing 
deficit is defined as the difference between a firm’s requirement for funds (due to investment 
and dividend payments) and internally generated funds, and is identically equal to the sum of 
net issue of debt plus net issue of equity. Our results, based on the same specifications as for 
the asset growth, are reported in Table 5. We find that leniency laws are associated with a 
higher financing deficit, that is, larger issuance activity. 
We further study the sources of financing. Table 6 presents the results for the net equity 
issuance, and Table 7 presents the results for the net debt issuance. Overall, we find strong 
effects for equity issuance and weaker effects for the debt issuance. That both debt and equity 
issuances increase is consistent with the finding that the financing deficit increases after the 
                                                          
16 Here, we only rely on Compustat North America and Worldscope data sets because Compustat Global does not 
provide the detailed decomposition of different asset categories. 
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passage of leniency laws as firms step up investment and experience decrease in profits. 
However, most of the effect comes from the equity issuance. The economic magnitude of the 
effect of a leniency law, though positive and often statistically significant, for debt issuance is 
about one-tenth of that for equity issuance.  
Among firm-level control variables in panels A and B, we find that asset size is associated 
with higher issuance activity while profitability is associated with the lower issuance activity. 
Tangibility has contrasting effects for equity and debt issuance, – while higher tangibility of 
assets correlates with lower equity issuance, it is associated with higher debt issuance, 
consistent with the previous literature. 
These varying results on debt and equity also mean that it is unlikely that the result is 
driven by lower collusion in the supply of capital. If leniency laws affected the collusion 
between financial institutions, it is more likely that the supply of debt capital, such as bank 
lending, would have been affected, as opposed to the supply of equity capital. In such case, 
debt should have become cheaper and thus firms should have expanded their borrowing.17 
 
3.4 Debt-to-equity ratio 
Finally, we present the results of the regressions that examine the effect of leniency law 
adoption on the book debt-to-equity ratio. The effect of leniency law on the book debt-to-equity 
ratio reflects the type and size of issuance activity and the firm’s retention policy (which, in 
turn, depends on profitability). While the tilt toward equity issuance is likely to lower the debt-
to-equity ratio, lower profitability is likely to raise it. 
                                                          
17 That said, supply-side considerations could mean that we are underestimating the effect of equity issuances. 
Local equity markets in smaller countries might not be able to absorb large equity issuances coming from the top 
players in one particular industry at the same time. 
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To avoid outliers and negative values, we limit the book debt-to-equity ratio between 0 and 
9 (which corresponds to the debt-asset ratio of 0 to 0.9).18 Table 8 presents the results, where 
we follow the same sequence of specifications as for the asset growth and the issuance 
activities. We find that the passage of a leniency law has a significant negative effect on the 
debt-to-equity ratio. The economic magnitude of the impact is large: in the baseline 
specification of Column 2 of panel A, the treated firms reduce the debt ratio by 0.025 relative 
to control firms, which is 2.5% (5.7%) of the sample mean (median) debt ratio. Among the 
control variables, leverage is positively related to firm size (log book value of assets) and 
negatively related to firm profitability (return on assets (ROA)), which are well-documented 
results in the literature (see Frank and Goyal 2009). Leverage is positively related to the 
country’s GDP, and negatively related to changes in the exchange rate, which is likely to reflect 
competitive pressure and may be capturing an expected decline in future profits. While 
tangibility has a significant positive effect on the debt-to-equity ratio (consistent with the 
literature), lagged sales growth and industry market-to-book ratio has a negative effect. 
Panel B reports the results, where we instead use Export market leniency laws for 
identification. The coefficient of the Export market leniency laws variable is negative but 
statistically significant in only some of the specifications. 
Overall, these results do not find much support for theories that argue that debt has strategic 
value in oligopolistic industries (e.g., Maksimovic 1988). If firms communicate during the 
collusive arrangements (and such communication is not considered as cheap talk), debt has no 
strategic value. However, when the collusion breaks down, debt might start having a strategic 
                                                          
18 Our results hold when we change the dependent variable to be the debt to debt plus equity ratio, which is a 
monotone transformation of the debt-to-equity ratio. We only consider book debt ratios because of missing data 
required to calculate the market value of equity for most of the international firms. Our results also hold when we 
limit the debt-to-equity ratio to between 0 and 8 (instead of between 0 and 9) or when we exclude negative values 
and winsorize the book debt-to-equity ratio at 1%, 5%, or 0.5%. 
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use. Our evidence does not suggest that the debt ratio goes up after the passage of leniency law. 
On the contrary, debt ratios fall and firms increase equity issuance.   
The results in this section also suggest that the channel through which competition affects 
leverage is different from the one in Xu (2012). Xu (2012) finds that leverage drops when there 
is greater import penetration in an industry (e.g., caused by tariff cuts or currency depreciation), 
and suggests that this could be because firms anticipate lower future profits and face higher 
probability of default. She further finds that her results are stronger for financially weaker (low 
z-score) firms, which is consistent with trade-off theory. In contrast, our results are stronger 
for more profitable firms within the industry, which is what one would expect if more profitable 
firms are the ones that are ex ante more likely to be in collusion. 19  Further, while asset growth 
falls following tariff cuts in Xu’s (2012) setting, we find that firms expand by increasing the 
capital expenditure, investment in intangible assets, and adding to cash holdings. The shift to 
a new equilibrium potentially creates a situation in which financing growth with debt could 
leave these firms vulnerable to aggressive strategies by their rivals. Financing asset growth 
with debt could also mean that the firm is unable to respond to future expansion by more 
conservatively financed rivals due to the debt overhang problem – in fact, debt financed firms 
might invite even more aggressive predatory reactions from rival firms that are unencumbered 
by debt. 
 
4. Targeted Treatment, Robustness Tests, and Other Supportive Evidence 
4.1 Targeted treatment 
Not all industries are cartelized. Leniency law is likely to affect mostly those firms that are 
engaged in collusion, or have the potential to form cartels in the future. The latter firms are also 
                                                          
19 In Table IA9, we show that the effects of the leniency law on asset growth, financing deficit, and equity issuance 
are stronger for firms that are more profitable within their industries. 
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relevant for our study because, if the expected cost of cartel formation increases, firms might 
change their behavior, including their financing choices. For example, firms might be more 
willing to take on more debt if, under adverse industry conditions, cartelization becomes more 
feasible. If the cost of cartel formation increases, these firms may want to reduce debt even 
though they are not currently engaged in collusion. 20 
We conduct four sets of tests and report them in Table 9. We primarily rely on differences 
across industries. First, we estimate the propensity of a firm to be convicted in a cartel case. 
We use a prediction model based on time-varying firm characteristics (asset size, leverage, and 
ROA), country characteristics (GDP and unemployment), and country fixed effects and three-
digit SIC fixed effects. Industry characteristics are an important determinant of the potential 
for cartelization since cartels are known to proliferate in certain industries (see, for instance, a 
survey by Levenstein and Suslow (2006), who discuss a number of historical examples of 
industries in which there are repeated episodes of collusion). 21 Country-specific institutional 
features are also likely to be important determinants. We fit the prediction model by only using 
pre-leniency observations and predict the probability that the firm will be convicted in the cartel 
case after the passage of a leniency law. 
Panel A reports results for the asset growth (Columns 1 and 2), financing deficit (Columns 
3 and 4), equity issuance (Columns 5 and 6), debt issuance (Columns 7 and 8), and debt-to-
equity ratio (Columns 9 and 10) as the dependent variable for both the leniency law dummy 
and the export market based measure. Both measures are interacted with the predicted 
probability of conviction. Firms that are more likely to be convicted invest more and have a 
                                                          
20 An additional reason our results may not be limited to existing cartels could be that the breakdown of collusion 
in the segment of the market dominated by larger firms is likely to result in these firms expanding output and 
lowering prices, and so it might lead to lower profitability for smaller firms in the rest of the industry even though 
they are not cartelized. 
21 Admittedly, a three-digit SIC classification is a coarse partitioning of industry for our purposes, since many of 




higher financing deficit that they cover by issuing more equity. This results in lower leverage 
after the passage of leniency law in the home country. Meanwhile, the effect of the Export 
market leniency laws measure on equity (debt) issuances is more positive (negative) for firms 
with higher predicted probability of conviction. 
Second, in panel B, we sort the firms according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 
firm’s three-digit SIC industry in a particular year. The firms in the concentrated industries 
with fewer symmetric players find it easier to collude (see, e.g., the discussion in Motta 2004; 
on this being the most important cross-sectional factor empirically predicting collusion as well 
the experimental evidence in Huck, Normann, and Oeschssler 2004). We then interact leniency 
law passages with HHI. Panel B reports the results on asset growth (Columns 1 and 2), 
financing deficit (Columns 3 and 4), and net issuances (Columns 5 and 6). We find that our 
results on asset growth, financing deficit, and net equity issuances are stronger for more 
concentrated industries. We also report results for net debt issuances (Columns 7 and 8) and 
leverage (Columns 9 and 10), where we do not find a statistically significant interaction effect. 
Next, we look at the opposite prediction. Industries that can protect their profits in other 
ways and are thus effectively monopolized would need to rely less on the collusion and are 
thus less likely to be affected by the passage of leniency law. Moreover, collusion is also more 
fragile in innovative industries (Rey 2004). We sort the firms according to the number of 
patents filed by the U.S. firms at the USPTO in a firm’s three-digit SIC industry in a particular 
year. While we do not have data on patents filed by international firms, we argue that the 
industry-level prevalence of patent protection would be highly correlated across different 
countries (see, e.g., Bena et al. 2017 on the use of USPTO patents in the international sample 
of firms). We then interact leniency law passages with the log number of patents in firm’s 
industry. As reported in panel C, we find a weaker effect on asset growth (Columns 1 and 2), 
financing deficit (Columns 3 and 4), and net issuances (Columns 5 and 6) for the industries 
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that protect themselves with patents and need to rely less on the collusive activities. We do not 
find statistically significant differences in terms net debt issuances (Columns 7 and 8) and 
leverage (Columns 9 and 10). 
Finally, in panel D, we look at recent industry growth. High growth industry can be 
associated with less collusion under two sets of assumptions (Ivaldi et al. 2003). The first 
occurs when high growth encourages new entry, and the industry is expected to become less 
profitable in the future. In this scenario, the loss of future profits from being punished by rival 
firms if cooperation breaks down would lower compared with the gain from cheating today. 
The second scenario occurs when recent high growth implies a (temporary) upturn in a cyclical 
industry; in this case, the gain from deviation today would outweigh the loss from punishment 
in the future, and collusion could be more difficult to sustain (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). 
We use the three-digit SIC industry median of sales growth as the proxy for maturity of an 
industry. As before, we find that asset growth, financing deficit, and equity issuances are 
moderated by this cross-sectional characteristic while debt issuances and leverage are not 
affected differentially affected by the leniency laws for high-growth and low-growth industries.   
 
4.2 Dynamics 
One concern with our study is that leniency laws might have been anticipated and the 
adjustment might have started before the actual adoption of laws. In addition, if stronger laws 
are anticipated and weaker laws are passed, focusing on the actual adoption year might even 
reverse the sign of the estimates (Hennessy and Strebulaev 2015). The binary treatment such 
as the one adopted in our case mitigates the latter concern but we take it seriously. For each 
country, we collect the data on when the first discussion on leniency laws has been started by 
policy makers. To collect this information, we use Factiva News Database and search for the 
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news in local language about the leniency program adoption in competition law.22 Out of 54 
countries that have passed leniency laws as reported in Table 1, we have found leniency 
programs discussed in the media of 35 countries. Some smaller, especially Central and Eastern 
European, countries are not covered by Factiva and for a handful of those that are even covered 
we were not able to find that media discussed leniency laws before their passage. Out of these 
35 countries, we found that 26 had discussion about leniency laws at least 1 year before the 
law passage. We call this year the “anticipation year.” If the program was not discussed in the 
media, we assume that there was no additional anticipation, and we consider the actual year of 
adoption as anticipation year. 
In Table 10, we use this anticipation year as our treatment year. We find significant 
economic effects for asset growth (Column 1), financing deficit (Column 3), equity issuance 
(Column 5), and debt issuance (Column 7). We do not find a statistically significant effect for 
debt-to-equity ratio (Column 9). 
Using this definition of treatment year, we further explore the dynamics of the treatment 
effect, in particular, whether it shows up within a relatively short period after the law is 
discussed for the first time, and whether we can find any pre-trends in the data. To explore the 
dynamics of the issuance activities and leverage change, we create dummy variables 
corresponding to the following windows around the treatment year: from 1 to 4 years before 
the treatment; the treatment year and the 2 years after treatment; the next 3 years; and the years 
beyond. We find that firms first start growing and issuing equity over the first two sub-periods 
after the discussion about the leniency law passage started and there is no pre-trend once 
anticipation effect is taken into account. We do not find that the effect is long-lasting and it 
disappears in the period that starts at 6 years after the anticipation of the law. 
                                                          
22 The terms differ across countries, even when they use the same language. For instance, in Chile, the earliest 
mentioned term used “delación compensada,” in Mexico “programa de indulgencia,” and in Spain “Clemencia.” 
As every local competition authority discusses leniency programs on their websites, we primarily use the official 
wording that they adopt there but we also experiment with similar terms using Google Translate. 
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4.3 Robustness tests 
In Table 11, we report further robustness tests. We only report the coefficients on the leniency 
law (panel A) or export-market leniency law measure (panel B) for the respective regressions 
where the outcome variable is reported in the column. The full set of coefficients for these 
regressions are reported in Tables IA10 and IA11. 
4.3.1 Control for the acquisitions, the degree of competition, other laws, and clustering. 
We start our robustness tests by examining whether our results hold when we control for 
industry*region*year fixed effects. That is, in these tests we would be comparing German car 
manufacturers to French car manufacturers when the leniency law was passed in Germany, but 
not in France. This test controls for industry trends within each region. As reported in panel A, 
row 1, our estimates are lower but they are statistically significant at similar levels. 
We further control for the fact that leniency laws induced firms to engage in more merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities (Dong, Massa, and Žaldokas 2017) and the increase in equity 
might correspond to firms paying target shareholders in stock. We control for this in two ways. 
First, in row 2, we exclude firm-years with the acquisitions as reported in Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum database. Second, in row 3, we exclude those firms that engaged in M&A 
activity within 3 years after the passage of leniency law in their country. Our sample drops by 
17%, but we find consistent results both in terms of economic and statistical significance. 
Further, we control for general trends in changing concentration and competitive 
environment. In row 4, we show that controlling for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index has no 
effect on the coefficient of leniency law. As shown in row 5, the volume of imports to the 
firm’s industry also does not affect the effect of leniency law on issuance activity, suggesting 
that we are capturing a distinct effect of changing international trade activity that the firm faces. 
In row 6, we lag our control variables rather than control for the contemporaneous variables, 
which does not affect our results. Further, in rows 7–10, we explore the sensitivity of our 
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estimates’ statistical significance when we cluster our standard errors in a different way. While 
in our baseline specifications we cluster them at the industry*country level, here we report that 
the statistical significance is consistent when we cluster them by country (row 7), double cluster 
by country and year (row 8), double cluster by industry and year (row 9), or double cluster by 
country and industry (row 10). 
We further control for the economic conditions and contemporaneous changes in other 
legislation.  First, in row 11, we control for the conditions in the capital and credit markets. In 
particular, we add the controls of time-varying stock market capitalization to GDP and private 
credit to GDP. The inclusion of these control variables addresses the concern that firms may 
be timing the market when issuing equity.  
Second, by adopting policies (e.g., leniency laws) that promote fair competition in an 
economy, the country also strengthens its rule of law, which makes the country more attractive 
for investment and innovation. In row 12, we control for the measures of the rule of law, 
regulatory quality, and the quality of judicial system based on WorldBank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. We do not find that this affects our estimates. 
Moreover, the enforcement of leniency laws can differ across countries. While we are not 
able to measure which leniency laws would be more successful ex ante at the time of their 
implementation, we can focus solely on the countries with high regulatory quality based on 
WorldBank Worldwide Governance Indicators. In row 13, we redefine the leniency law 
variable to be one only for the countries that have regulatory quality higher than the median 
regulatory quality around the world at the time of the implementation of the leniency law.  
We further recognize that there were additional changes in antitrust law during our period 
of study. In particular, there has been a significant increase in penalties, changes in what 
constitutes cartel conduct and new violation provisions, and investigative powers of antitrust 
authorities. Throughout this paper we focus on leniency law as the passage of leniency law is 
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a clearly identifiable and measurable event while other provisions might have occurred at 
multiple times in each country (e.g., change in penalties) or might have had unclear effects on 
the cartel conduct (e.g., changes in violation provisions). If anything, even if there were 
correlated changes in anticartel provisions, our identification using leniency law should then 
proxy for a general strengthening of the anticartel provisions and are informative of a general 
enforcement effect. That said, our estimates might be biased if we misattribute the gradual 
strengthening of anticartel provisions to 1 particular year (i.e., when leniency law was passed). 
For some countries, we were able to collect data on other provisions from International 
Competition Network and control for them explicitly by adding dummies when, for example, 
the first penalty was increased in our sample period or the first time when the definition of what 
constitutes cartel conduct has been changed. As can be seen in row 14, such controls do not 
significantly alter our estimates, giving confidence that the passage of leniency laws has been 
a crucial legislative policy. 
Finally, in row 15, we control for other types of policy changes that could have overlapped 
with leniency law adoption, such as the general competition law, corporate governance law, 
corporate taxes, and Chinn-Ito index of capital market openness. We do not find that any of 
these laws affect our estimates. This is comforting as, for instance, capital market openness 
arguably correlates with the country's integration into the global economy, so our leniency law 
variable is not simply proxying for that.  
We report corresponding tests for export market leniency laws in Table 11, panel B. 
Because of a different construction of the variable, we exclude the test in which we exclude 
firms that engaged in M&A within 3 years after the leniency law and the test in which we focus 
on high regulatory quality countries. 
For debt-to-equity ratio, we provide a few additional robustness checks. In particular, our 
results are robust if we add lagged leverage as an additional control, in the spirit of target 
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adjustment models and also to capture that leverage is highly persistent. The inclusion of lagged 
leverage allows us to interpret the coefficients of the other right-hand-side variables as their 
effects on the change in the debt-to-equity ratio. The effect of leniency law on the change in 
leverage is also significantly negative, and the estimated magnitude of the effect increases 
three-fold when firm fixed effects are dropped.23 We report these results in Table IA10, panel 
J, Columns 6 and 7, for leniency law and Table IA11, panel J, columns 5 and 6, for export 
market leniency laws. 
4.3.2 Large issuances. 
In Table IA12, panels A and B, we estimate probit models for large equity (debt) issuances and 
repurchases. A large equity or debt issuance is defined as a net increase in excess of 5% of 
book value of assets, while a large repurchase (debt retirement) is defined as a net decrease of 
more than -1.25% (-5%) of assets.24 The tables report probit marginal effects. The results 
suggest that passage of a leniency law is associated with a 9% increase in the likelihood of a 
large equity issuance, compared to a 5.5% increase in the probability of a large debt issuance.  
4.3.3 Non-U.S. firms. 
Finally, almost of our results hold if we limit the sample to non-U.S. firms. In Table IA8, we 
replicate Tables 3–5 that provide the main results of the paper. Panels A–E report results for 
leniency law, and panels F–J report results for export-based leniency law measure. Panels A 
and F show the results for asset growth, corresponding to Table 3; panels B and G show results 
for financing deficit, corresponding to Table 5; panels C and H show results for net equity 
issuances, corresponding to Table 6; panels D and I show results for net debt issuances, 
corresponding to Table 7; and panels E and J the results for leverage specifications, 
                                                          
23 Note that the specifications in Table IA10, panel J, Column 6, and Table IA11, panel J, Column 5, which include 
firm fixed effects, are known to produce biased coefficient estimates because of the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable (Nickell 1981).   




corresponding to Table 8. We find that most of the results consistently show that, following 
leniency law passages , the asset growth, the financing deficit, and the equity issuances 
increased for firms outside of the United States. 
 
5. Additional Supporting Evidence: ACPERA 
To provide additional supportive evidence for our international leniency law-based tests, we 
look for other cases of strengthening of anticartel legislation. In particular, we study the 
enactment of Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) in the 
United States in 2004, which has been one of the most significant revisions in the history of 
the U.S. antitrust enforcement system. The act increased the corporate fines for firms in price-
fixing conspiracies, allowing up to $100 million corporate fines, up to $1 million individual 
fines, and up to a 10-year prison term. Moreover, the ACPERA provided more incentives for 
firms applying for leniency. In particular, the ACPERA stipulated that in civil actions alleging 
violations of the Sherman Act, such as price fixing, leniency applicants are only liable for actual 
damages caused by their conduct, as opposed to treble damages.  
We thus look at the passage of ACPERA as our alternative identification strategy. We only 
focus on the U.S. firms and argue that firms that are more likely to be cartelized will be affected 
by ACPERA more. We use a prediction model, similar to the one in Section 4.1, and we fit it 
to the data of the U.S. firms that were convicted of being part of a cartel up to year 2003. We 
then use firm observables in 2004 to predict the likelihood of being convicted in a collusion 
case. As before, our prediction model is based on time-varying firm characteristics (asset size, 
leverage, and ROA) and three-digit SIC fixed effects. Compared to the prediction model in 
Section 4.1, we exclude country fixed effects and country characteristics as we only focus on 
the U.S. cases. 
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We report the results in Table 12. We find larger asset growth, an increase in financing 
deficit, and an increase in equity issuance for firms with higher predicted conviction after 
ACPERA was passed. Interestingly, we find a drop in debt issuances. We do not find a 
statistically significant effect on leverage. 
These out-of-sample tests provide comforting evidence that anticartel enforcement has 
significant effects on the firm growth and their financing behavior. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We consider the case of a change in competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement 
around the world to show that more intense strategic competition and expanding output is 
associated with significantly more equity issuance, a slight increase in debt issuance, and lower 
leverage ratio. 
Our identification relies on the difference-in-differences estimation based on a staggered 
passage of leniency laws in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012. In addition to 
exploiting a leniency law passage in the firm’s country, we look at the leniency law passages 
in the main export markets of the firm’s industry, and leniency law passages in the firm’s 
subsidiary locations, and find consistent results. 
We argue that as collusion becomes more difficult to sustain, the nature of equilibrium 
switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition. Firms have to expand investment to 
compete for market share, but prefer to do so with equity rather than debt to maintain financial 
flexibility and avoid debt overhang.  
Importantly, countries passed the leniency programs at different points in time between 
1993 and 2011. Our purpose is to take advantage of the staggered nature of the law passage to 
identify the effect of a less collusive product market environment on firms’ financing decisions 
by following a difference-in-differences strategy. In other words, controlling for firm and time 
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fixed effects, we attempt to compare the (change in) financing choices of firms that were 
affected by the law with those of the control group of firms that were headquartered in the 
countries that have not yet passed such a law. We note, however, that it is possible that other 
policy changes or other economic shocks occurring simultaneously with the passage of 
leniency laws in different countries at different points of time could affect capital structure 
choices in the same direction. We collect information on an exhaustive set of law changes in 
different countries and control for the passage of these laws. In addition, our own reading of 
the background of leniency law adoption in different countries suggests that these laws were 
not adopted for one specific reason. Nonetheless, the leniency law passage was arguably not 
random and thus it is difficult to claim that we undoubtedly identify the causal effect. Further 
research could analyze the political economy of stronger anticartel enforcement and reveal 
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Figure 1. Trends 
 
We plot mean change in asset growth, winsorized at 1%, net equity issuance and 
net debt issuance, winsorized at 1%, net equity issuance (common stock over 
lagged assets), winsorized at 1%, and net debt issuance (financial debt over lagged 
assets), winsorized at 1%. As a control sample, we consider firms that were not 
affected by a leniency law over the same period as the treated firm but were in the 
same SIC3 industry; that is, control firms did not have a leniency law introduced 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. Asset growth, financing deficit, net equity issuance, net debt issuance, 
ROA, and sales growth are winsorized at 1%. The debt-to-equity ratio is limited to 
between 0 and 9. 
 
 N Mean Median SD 
Asset growth 569,403 0.246 0.052 0.936 
Financing deficit 530,550 0.285 0.021 1.168 
Net equity issuance 536,239 0.238 0.004 1.041 
Net debt issuance 560,697 0.037 0.000 0.212 
Assets ($millions) 633,400 3,692.295 100.353 892,415.2 
ROA 565,328 0.016 0.077 0.389 
Debt/equity 559,797 0.978 0.439   1.475 
Tangibility 462,654 0.316 0.270 0.242 





Table 2. Leniency laws 
This table reports leniency law passage by country. Our primary source of 
information is the Cartel Regulation 2013, published by Getting the Deal Through. 
We complement this data set using press releases and news articles. 
 
Country Year Country Year 
Argentina None Lithuania 2008 
Australia 2003 Luxembourg 2004 
Austria 2006 Malaysia 2010 
Belgium 2004 Mexico 2006 
Brazil 2000 Netherlands 2002 
Bulgaria 2003 New Zealand 2004 
Canada 2000 Nigeria None 
Chile 2009 Norway 2005 
China 2008 Oman None 
Colombia 2009 Pakistan 2007 
Croatia 2010 Peru 2005 
Cyprus 2011 Philippines 2009 
Czech Republic 2001 Poland 2004 
Denmark 2007 Portugal 2006 
Ecuador 2011 Romania 2004 
Estonia 2002 Russia 2007 
Finland 2004 Singapore 2006 
France 2001 Slovakia 2001 
Germany 2000 Slovenia 2010 
Greece 2006 South Africa 2004 
Hong Kong None Spain 2008 
Hungary 2003 Sweden 2002 
Iceland 2005 Switzerland 2004 
India 2009 Taiwan 2012 
Indonesia None Thailand None 
Ireland 2001 Turkey 2009 
Israel 2005 Ukraine 2012 
Italy 2007 United Kingdom 1998 
Japan 2005 USA 1993 
Jordan None Venezuela None 
Korea 1997 Zambia None 






Table 3. Asset growth 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This 
table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, where the dependent variable is annual asset growth, winsorized at 
1%. All regressions, except where it is stated otherwise, include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. 
 
In panel A, our main variable of interest is the Leniency law dummy. In Column 1, we test its effect without any additional 
controls. In Column 2, we control for firm and country characteristics. In Column 3, we control for additional firm and 
industry characteristics. Column 4 includes SIC3 industry*year fixed effects. Column 5 includes geographic region*year 
fixed effects. Column 6 restricts the sample to non-U.S. firms. Column 7 treats the EU as one country and for EU member 
countries assumes the passage of leniency law to be the later of 2002 and the year when the country joined the EU. In panel 
B, our main variable of interest is a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries. 
In Column 1, we test its effect without any additional controls. In Column 2, we control for firm and country characteristics. 
In Column 3, we control for additional firm and industry characteristics. Column 4 includes SIC3 industry*year fixed 
effects. Column 5 includes geographic region*year fixed effects. Column 6 restricts the sample to non-U.S. firms. In 
Column 7 the main variable of interest is instead a continuous variable of firm subsidiary location-weighted laws passed in 
other countries.  
 




A. Leniency law 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Leniency law 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.033** 0.024 0.050** 
                                3.275 3.954 5.108 4.964 2.044 1.432 2.488 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.118 0.237 0.179 0.253 0.247 0.232 0.237 





B. Export market laws (in other countries) 
 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export market leniency laws 0.080*** 0.123*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.063*** 0.051***  
                                5.193 6.011 4.485 6.540 4.038 3.276  
Subsidiary-based leniency laws       0.046** 
       2.226 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.094 0.198 0.168 0.204 0.208 0.164 0.237 




Table 4. Deconstructing asset growth 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This table reports 
OLS regressions, where in Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is capital expenditures, scaled by lagged assets; in 
Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is change in intangible assets, scaled by lagged assets; in Columns 5 and 6, 
the dependent variable is change in the cash and cash equivalents, scaled by lagged assets. All regressions include firm 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. 
 
Our main variable of interest is the Leniency law dummy in Columns 1, 3, and 5, and a continuous variable of country-
SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries in Columns 2, 4, and 6. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leniency law 0.012***  0.008***  0.040***  
                                    3.866  8.350  4.474  
Export market leniency laws                 0.020***  0.012***  0.055*** 
                                     4.262  8.511  4.180 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                           0.143 0.089 0.134 0.098 0.232 0.218 
N                                   281,790 131,923 208,727 97,321 356,624 160,392 
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Table 5. Financing deficit 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This 
table reports OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the financing deficit defined as the difference between a 
firm’s requirement for funds (due to investment and dividend payments) and internally generated funds, and is identically 
equal to the sum of net issue of debt plus net issue of equity, winsorized at 1%. All regressions, except where it is stated 
otherwise, include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. 
In panel A, our main variable of interest is the Leniency law dummy. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform 
the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel A, and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption 
of Table 3, panel A. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
In panel B, our main variable of interest is a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other 
countries. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel B, 
and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel B.  
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
A. Leniency law 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Leniency law 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.033** 0.045*** 0.055*** 
                                4.185 4.951 5.420 6.413 2.338 3.140 2.963 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.266 0.460 0.389 0.468 0.465 0.413 0.460 
N                               516,999 428,853 229,477 428,784 428,851 311,676 428,853 
 
B. Export market laws in other countries 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export market leniency laws 0.079*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.053*** 0.058***  
                                5.091 6.077 4.477 6.793 3.544 4.099  
Subsidiary-based leniency laws       0.057*** 
       2.907 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.274 0.460 0.415 0.462 0.465 0.333 0.369 





Table 6. Net equity issuance 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. 
This table reports OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is change in common stock over lagged assets, 
winsorized at 1%. All regressions, except where it is stated otherwise, include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. In panel A, our main variable of interest is the Leniency 
law dummy. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel 
A, and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel A. 
 
In panel B, our main variable of interest is a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other 
countries. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel B, 
and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel B.  
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
A. Leniency law 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Leniency law 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.032** 0.043*** 0.048*** 
                                3.901 4.450 5.502 6.054 2.545 3.459 2.609 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.276 0.468 0.393 0.476 0.473 0.438 0.468 
N                               522,581 432,711 229,888 432,646 432,709 315,016 432,711 
 
B. Export market laws in other countries 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export market leniency laws 0.065*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.085*** 0.043*** 0.047***  
                                4.623 5.378 4.799 6.042 3.566 4.027  
Subsidiary-based leniency laws       0.048*** 
       3.126 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.280 0.460 0.417 0.463 0.466 0.352 0.409 





Table 7. Net debt issuance 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. 
This table reports OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is change in financial debt over lagged assets, winsorized 
at 1%. All regressions, except where it is stated otherwise, include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. In panel A, our main variable of interest is the Leniency law 
dummy. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel A, 
and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel A.  
 
In panel B, our main variable of interest is a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other 
countries. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel B, 
and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel B.  
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
A. Leniency law 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Leniency law 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.004** 0.000 0.001 0.004** 
                                3.038 2.738 0.583 2.254 0.043 0.403 2.179 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.065 0.088 0.089 0.092 0.090 0.086 0.088 
N                               545,275 448,583 230,890 448,500 448,581 328,856 448,583 
 
B. Export market laws in other countries 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export market leniency laws 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.006 0.004  
                                3.011 3.498 0.273 3.554 1.497 1.063  
Subsidiary-based leniency laws       -0.001 
       -0.149 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.059 0.079 0.087 0.080 0.082 0.092 0.083 





Table 8. Debt-to-equity ratio 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. 
This table reports OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is book debt to book equity ratio, limited to between 0 
and 9. All regressions, except where it is stated otherwise, include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. In panel A, our main variable of interest is the Leniency law 
dummy. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel A, 
and in the interest of space we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel A.  
 
In panel B, our main variable of interest is a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other 
countries. Except for a different dependent variable, we perform the same set of specifications used in Table 3, panel B, 
and, in the interest of space, we refer to the description in the caption of Table 3, panel B.  
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
A. Leniency law 
 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Leniency law -0.012 -0.025* -0.052*** -0.023* -0.045*** -0.011 -0.009 
                                -0.985 -1.875 -3.338 -1.739 -3.221 -0.789 -0.601 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.590 0.618 0.579 0.620 0.620 0.639 0.618 
N                               546,937 409,725 217,938 409,651 409,723 305,758 409,725 
 
B. Export market laws (in other countries) 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export market leniency laws -0.033 -0.046* -0.111*** -0.046* -0.053* -0.005  
                                -1.359 -1.651 -3.762 -1.693 -1.703 -0.159  
Subsidiary-based leniency laws       -0.014 
       -0.336 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional controls N N Y N N N N 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry*year fixed effects N N N Y N N N 
Region*year fixed effects N N N N Y N N 
R-squared                        0.602 0.623 0.568 0.625 0.625 0.642 0.616 




Table 9. Heterogeneity 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This table reports OLS regressions. Columns 1 and 2 
report the results where the dependent variable is annual asset growth, winsorized at 1%; Columns 3 and 4 report the results where the dependent variable is net issue of debt 
plus net issue of equity, winsorized at 1%; Columns 5 and 6 report the results, where the dependent variable is change in common stock over lagged assets, winsorized at 1%; 
Columns 7 and 8 report the results where the dependent variable is change in financial debt over lagged assets, winsorized at 1%; Columns 9 and 10 report the results where 
the dependent variable is book debt to book equity ratio, limited to between 0 and 9. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects, and controls such as log 
assets, ROA, log GDP, unemployment rate, country imports as the percentage of GDP, and exchange rate change. Standard errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry 
level. 
 
In panel A, our main variable of interest is the interaction between the passage of the leniency laws and the likelihood that the market is cartelized. We use a prediction model 
based on time-varying firm characteristics (asset size, leverage and ROA), country characteristics (GDP and unemployment), as well country fixed effects and SIC3 fixed 
effects. We fit the prediction model only by using pre-leniency observations and predict the probability that the firm will be convicted in the cartel case in the year after the 
passage of the leniency law. In Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the passage of the leniency law and the predicted 
conviction probability. In Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws 
passed in other countries and the predicted conviction probability.  
 
In panel B, our main variable of interest is the interaction between the passage of the leniency laws and Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the firm’s industry in a specific year. 
In Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the passage of the leniency law and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. In Columns 2, 
4, 6, 8, and 10, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  
 
In panel C, our main variable of interest is the interaction between the passage of the leniency laws and the number of patents filed with the USPTO by the firms in the firm’s 
industry in a specific year. In Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the passage of the leniency law and the number of patents. 
In Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries 
and the number of patents.  
 
In panel D, our main variable of interest is the interaction between the passage of the leniency laws and the median lagged 2-year sales growth in the firm’s industry. In Columns 
1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the passage of the leniency law and the industry growth. In Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, our main 
variable of interest is the interaction term between a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries and the industry growth.  
 





A. Predicted convictions 
 
 Asset Growth Financing Deficit Equity Issuance Debt Issuance Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Leniency law -0.044***  -0.018  -0.017  -0.002  -0.023*  
 -3.176  -1.587  -1.629  -1.022  -1.911  
Export market leniency laws  -0.021  -0.012  -0.016  0.001  -0.027 
                                 -1.558  -0.856  -1.191  0.410  -1.044 
Leniency law*Predicted conviction 0.802***  0.633***  0.666***  -0.029  -1.434*  
 3.331  3.144  3.796  -0.661  -1.733  
Export market leniency 
laws*Predicted conviction 
 0.933***  0.959***  1.035***  -0.089*  -1.513 
  3.193  3.489  4.005  -1.805  -1.269 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                        0.148 0.135 0.328 0.335 0.344 0.356 0.061 0.046 0.591 0.590 







 Asset growth Financing deficit Equity issuance Debt issuance Debt-to-equity ratio 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Leniency law 0.046**  0.060***  0.050***  0.005***  -0.019  
 2.512  3.806  3.485  2.602  -1.091  
Export market leniency laws  0.097***  0.092***  0.072***  0.010***  -0.027 
                                 5.403  5.357  4.483  3.149  -0.804 
Leniency law*HHI 0.173***  0.137**  0.137**  -0.002  -0.037  
 2.735  2.280  2.430  -0.311  -0.591  
Export market leniency laws* HHI  0.189**  0.165**  0.166***  0.000  -0.119 
  2.338  2.018  2.124  -0.02  -1.073 
HHI 0.066 0.068 0.084 0.071 0.078 0.067 0.006 0.002 0.020 -0.027 
 0.960 0.549 1.254 0.585 1.208 0.556 0.741 0.262 0.323 -0.306 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                        0.239 0.199 0.463 0.464 0.470 0.463 0.087 0.078 0.620 0.624 






C. Patent protection 
 Asset growth  Financing deficit Equity issuance Debt issuance Debt-to-equity ratio 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Leniency law 0.209***  0.185***  0.174***  0.006  -0.025  
 5.869  5.727  5.551  1.592  -0.977  
Export market leniency laws  0.316***  0.276***  0.248***  0.014**  -0.048 
                                 4.496  4.108  3.837  2.460  -0.919 
Leniency law*Industry patents -0.029***  -0.022***  -0.022***  0.000  0.001  
 -4.290  -3.824  -3.956  -0.369  0.120  
Export market leniency laws* 
Industry patents  -0.039***  -0.032***  -0.030***  -0.001  0.000 
  -3.378  -2.834  -2.758  -0.697  0.044 
Industry patents -0.013 -0.006 -0.014* -0.006 -0.016** -0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 
 -1.534 -0.665 -1.895 -0.773 -2.319 -0.964 1.536 0.621 -0.540 -0.833 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                        0.243 0.203 0.468 0.470 0.471 0.469 0.085 0.075 0.619 0.629 




D. Industry growth 
 Asset growth Financing deficit Equity issuance Debt issuance Debt-to-equity ratio 
                                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Leniency law 0.546***  0.506***  0.484***  -0.007  -0.116  
 3.899  3.580  3.716  -0.396  -1.506  
Export market leniency laws  0.549***  0.482**  0.417**  0.009  0.027 
                                 2.791  2.403  2.164  0.366  0.180 
Leniency law*Industry growth -0.429***  -0.384***  -0.371***  0.009  0.080  
 -3.233  -2.931  -3.056  0.585  1.195  
Export market leniency laws* 
Industry growth  -0.384**  -0.327*  -0.282*  -0.002  -0.068 
  -2.277  -1.860  -1.671  -0.088  -0.517 
Industry growth 0.713*** 0.608*** 0.593*** 0.577*** 0.519*** 0.513*** 0.038*** 0.026* -0.256*** -0.294*** 
 6.057 3.971 5.648 3.644 5.291 3.496 3.126 1.751 -3.894 -2.796 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                        0.238 0.200 0.461 0.465 0.468 0.465 0.089 0.079 0.617 0.622 






Table 10. Anticipation, placebo tests, and dynamics 
 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This table reports OLS regressions. Columns 
1 and 2 report the results where the dependent variable is annual asset growth, winsorized at 1%; Columns 3 and 4 report the results where the dependent variable is 
net issue of debt plus net issue of equity, winsorized at 1%; Columns 5 and 6 report the results where the dependent variable is change in common stock over lagged 
assets, winsorized at 1%; Columns 7 and 8 report the results where the dependent variable is change in financial debt over lagged assets, winsorized at 1%; and 
Columns 9 and 10 report the results where the dependent variable is book debt to book equity ratio, limited to between 0 and 9. All regressions include firm fixed 
effects and time fixed effects and controls such as log assets, ROA, log GDP, unemployment rate, country imports as % of GDP, and exchange rate change. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. 
 
In Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, our main variable of interest is leniency law passage, when anticipation effect is taken into account. We define the anticipated leniency 
law based on when the law was first discussed in the local media of the respective country. In Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, our main variables of interest are the dummy 
variables of from 1 to 4 years before the anticipated leniency law; the year of the anticipated leniency law and the 2 years after it; the next 3 years; and the years 
beyond. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
                                    Asset growth Financing deficit Equity issuance Debt issuance Debt-to-equity ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Anticipated leniency law  0.094**  0.097***  0.086***  0.006*  -0.020  
                                    2.234  2.884  2.975  1.818  -0.430  
Anticipated leniency law (-4, -1)  0.099  0.082  0.082  0.001  0.014 
                                     1.491  1.452  1.589  0.170  0.250 
Anticipated leniency law (0, 2)  0.139**  0.129**  0.122**  0.005  -0.002 
                                     2.046  2.367  2.353  0.888  -0.027 
Anticipated leniency law (3, 5)  0.151*  0.137**  0.129**  0.010  -0.031 
                                     1.831  2.191  2.36  1.139  -0.306 
Anticipated leniency law (6+)  0.025  0.016  0.027  0.004  -0.018 
                                     0.255  0.197  0.364  0.416  -0.151 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                           0.239 0.241 0.462 0.464 0.468 0.469 0.088 0.088 0.619 0.619 
N                                   455,003 455,003 429,793 429,793 433,662 433,662 449,534 449,534 409,908 409,908 
58 
 
Table 11. Robustness tests 
We consider all nonfinancial Worldscope, Compustat Global, and Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 
2012. This table reports OLS regressions, where the dependent variables are listed in the columns. All regressions 
are estimated independently. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country-SIC3 industry level. 
 
In panel A, for each specification, indicated by the row number, we report the coefficient on our main variable of 
interest, the Leniency law dummy, and the respective t-statistic. Row 1 controls for industry*region*year fixed 
effects. Row 2 excludes firm-years where firms have performed acquisitions as reported in the SDC Platinum 
database. Row 3 excludes the firms that performed acquisitions within the first 3 years after the passage of leniency 
laws in their country. Row 4 controls for HHI in firm’s SIC3 industry in its country. Row 5 controls for log imports 
to a firm’s SIC3 industry in its country. Row 6 lags control variables. Row 7 clusters standard errors at the country 
level. Row 8 double clusters standard errors at the country and the year level. Row 9 double clusters standard 
errors at the industry and the year level. Row 10 double clusters standard errors at the country and the industry 
level. Row 11 controls for the financial development in the country. Row 12 controls for the country’s government 
effectiveness, regulator quality, and rule of law. Row 13 focuses on leniency law passages only in the countries 
with high regulator quality. Row 14 controls for other forms of strengthening anticartel legislation. Row 15 
controls for other law changes such as the introduction of competition law, the change in corporate governance 
law, and Chinn-Ito index of degree of capital account openness, and corporate tax rate.  
 
In panel B, for each specification, indicated by the row number, we report the coefficient on our main variable of 
interest, a continuous variable of country-SIC3 export-weighted laws passed in other countries, and the respective 
t-statistic. Row 1 controls for industry*region*year fixed effects. Row 2 excludes firm-years where firms have 
performed acquisitions as reported in the SDC Platinum database. Row 3 controls for HHI in firm’s SIC3 industry 
in its country. Row 4 controls for log imports to a firm’s SIC3 industry in its country. Row 5 lags control variables. 
Row 6 clusters standard errors at the country level. Row 7 double clusters standard errors at the country and the 
year level. Row 8 double clusters standard errors at the industry and the year level. Row 9 double clusters standard 
errors at the country and the industry level. Row 10 controls for the financial development in the country. Row 
11 controls for the country’s government effectiveness, regulator quality, and rule of law. Row 12 controls for 
other forms of strengthening anticartel legislation. Row 13 controls for other law changes such as the introduction 
of competition law, the change in corporate governance law, and Chinn-Ito index of degree of capital account 
openness, and corporate tax rate.  
 




A. Leniency laws 
 












(1) Control for industry*region*year FEs 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.050*** 0.005*** 0.057** 
 7.578 8.325 8.539 3.469 2.476 
(2) Exclude firm-years with acquisitions 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.002 -0.020 
 3.522 4.726 4.446 1.111 -1.430 
(3) Exclude firms that engaged in M&A 
within 3 years after leniency law 
0.076*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.002 -0.011 
3.812 4.649 4.305 0.859 -0.715 
(4) Control for HHI 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.005*** -0.025* 
 3.967 4.962 4.455 2.763 -1.836 
(5) Control for imports 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.002 -0.049*** 
 4.468 4.461 4.460 0.987 -2.654 
(6) Lagged control variables 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.005*** -0.025* 
 4.326 5.000 4.481 2.618 -1.801 
(7) Cluster at the country level 0.073* 0.079** 0.072** 0.005 -0.027 
 1.829 2.466 2.624 1.165 -0.580 
(8) Double cluster at the country and the 
year level 
0.073* 0.079** 0.072** 0.005 -0.027 
1.835 2.488 2.522 1.096 -0.555 
(9) Double cluster at the industry and the 
year level 
0.073** 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.005 -0.027 
2.533 3.320 3.125 1.085 -1.108 
(10) Double cluster at the country and the 
industry level 
0.073* 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.005 -0.027 
1.954 2.828 3.109 1.145 -0.621 
(11) Control for financial development 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.003* -0.008 
 3.017 4.126 3.852 1.733 -0.585 
(12) Control for rule of law 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.000 -0.004 
 3.271 4.620 4.681 0.066 -0.268 
(13) Focus on high regulator quality 
countries 
0.047** 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.003* -0.033** 
2.530 3.414 3.173 1.746 -2.328 
(14) Control for other cartel legislation 
 
0.083*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.006*** -0.027* 
3.977 4.728 4.072 2.781 -1.836 
(15) Control for other law changes 
 
0.056*** 0.058*** 0.058*** -0.001 -0.062*** 




B. Export market laws (in other countries) 












(1) Control for industry*region*year FEs 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.002 0.095** 
 4.921 6.261 7.052 0.746 1.985 
(2) Exclude firm-years with acquisitions 0.111*** 0.101*** 0.087*** 0.006** -0.041 
 5.610 5.611 5.147 2.142 -1.421 
(3) Control for HHI 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.095*** 0.010*** -0.044 
 6.063 6.110 5.400 3.556 -1.577 
(4) Control for imports 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.103*** 0.007** -0.065** 
 5.668 5.736 5.150 2.546 -2.256 
(5) Lagged control variables 0.129*** 0.117*** 0.098*** 0.009*** -0.042 
 5.989 5.952 5.306 3.226 -1.501 
(6) Cluster at the country level 0.124** 0.115** 0.096** 0.010* -0.044 
 2.280 2.381 2.345 1.793 -0.597 
(7) Double cluster at the country and the 
year level 
0.124* 0.115** 0.096* 0.010 -0.044 
2.039 2.102 1.921 1.619 -0.582 
(8) Double cluster at the industry and the 
year level 
0.124** 0.115** 0.096** 0.010 -0.044 
2.767 2.755 2.273 1.554 -1.133 
(9) Double cluster at the country and the 
industry level 
0.124** 0.115** 0.096** 0.010* -0.044 
2.429 2.510 2.450 1.830 -0.641 
(10) Control for financial development 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.006** 0.005 
 4.795 4.648 4.208 1.979 0.195 
(11) Control for rule of law 
 
0.117*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.000 -0.004 
4.542 4.784 4.691 0.085 -0.132 
(12) Control for other cartel legislation 
 
0.116*** 0.110*** 0.092*** 0.010*** -0.044 
5.256 5.419 4.837 2.937 -1.452 
(13) Control for other law changes 
 
0.097*** 0.106*** 0.105*** -0.001 -0.107*** 




Table 12. Alternative test: ACPERA 
 
We consider all nonfinancial U.S.-headquartered Compustat North America firms from 1990 to 2012. This table 
reports OLS regressions. Column 1 reports the results where the dependent variable is annual asset growth, 
winsorized at 1%; Column 2 reports the results where the dependent variable is net issue of debt plus net issue of 
equity, winsorized at 1%; Column 3 reports the results, where the dependent variable is change in common stock 
over lagged assets, winsorized at 1%; Column 4 reports the results where the dependent variable is change in 
financial debt over lagged assets, winsorized at 1%; and Column 5 reports the results where the dependent variable 
is book debt-to-book-equity ratio, limited to between 0 and 9. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
Our main variable of interest is the interaction between the passage of ACPERA in 2004 and the likelihood that 
the market is cartelized. We use a prediction mode for U.S. firms based on time-varying firm characteristics (asset 
size, leverage, and ROA) as well SIC3 fixed effects. We fit the prediction model only by using pre-ACPERA 
observations and predict the probability that the firm will be convicted in the cartel case in the year after the 
passage of ACPERA, that is, 2004. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 











ACPERA*Predicted conviction           0.674* 0.639* 0.839*** -0.145*** -0.439 
                                    1.888 1.905 2.847 -2.644 -1.107 
Log assets                      0.253*** 0.192*** 0.158*** 0.025*** 0.076*** 
                                    25.121 18.571 16.759 12.384 8.198 
ROA      -1.026*** -2.024*** -1.789*** -0.075*** -0.052*** 
                                    -28.737 -51.703 -49.178 -11.028 -3.479 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared                           0.204 0.469 0.464 0.044 0.471 
N                                   75,327 73,685 73,927 75,071 70,805 
 
